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Abstract—One of the most crucial components of modern
Information Technology (IT) systems is data. It can be argued
that the majority of IT systems are built to collect, store, modify,
communicate and use data, enabling different data stakeholders
to access and use it to achieve different business objectives. The
confidentiality, integrity, availability, auditability, privacy, and
quality of the data is of paramount concern for end-users ranging
from ordinary consumers to multi-national companies. Over
the course of time, different frameworks have been proposed
and deployed to provide data security. Many of these previous
paradigms were specific to particular domains such as military or
media content providers, while in other cases they were generic
to different verticals within an industry. There is a much needed
push for a holistic approach to data security instead of the current
bespoke approaches. The age of the Internet has witnessed an
increased ease of sharing data with or without authorisation.
These scenarios have created new challenges for traditional data
security. In this paper, we study the evolution of data security
from the perspective of past proposed frameworks, and present
a novel Unified Model for Data Security (UMDS). The discussed
UMDS reduces the friction from several cross-domain challenges,
and has the functionality to possibly provide comprehensive data
security to data owners and privileged users.
Keywords-Data Security, Data Provenance, DRM, Access Con-
trol, Information Sharing, Cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
A crucial element of our modern inter-connected digital life
is data. It can manifest as holiday snaps, bank statements,
health records, next generation product design or military
tactics. The importance of data for ordinary users through to
multi-national corporations and governments cannot be over-
emphasized. Data protection was a critical concern even before
the advent of the Internet. Realisation of the importance of
securing data led to the development of the science of cryp-
tography and secure storage (i.e. safes and locks). In the age
of the Internet and increased connectivity, the ease of sharing
data with or without authorisation has created new challenges
for data security. These challenges have also seen the redesign
of data security from basic constructs of confidentiality and
access control to domains of privacy, availability, auditability,
quality of data and traceability.
*This work is a position paper that discusses notion of Data Security from
various aspects. We also present a new model for data security termed as
“Unified Model” with its objectives and requirements. The paper does not
present an implementation of the proposed “Unified Model”.
A. Growing Ineffectiveness of Traditional IT Security
The proliferation of the IT industry in different industries
presented new challenges associated with the protection of
data. Some early systems were designed to cater for partic-
ular sets of problems associated with specific industries; i.e.
Bell-LaPadula Model [1] and Biba Model [2], while other
mechanisms like Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [3] and
Access Control List (ACL) [4] were proposed as general-
purpose data (and services) security models. With increased
inter-connectivity and large scale data collection and sharing
between organisations, many of the traditional data security
paradigms solely based on ex ante (up-front) controls are no
longer effective [5]. An example is copyright control and the
need to accommodate fair use. Modern data security paradigms
not only require a gate-keeper approach, where each entity
has to authenticate before accessing the data, but should also
satisfy additional properties such as traceability and tamper-
evidence, discussed later in this paper. Another example is the
increasing ineffectiveness of IT perimeter defence (firewalls,
hardening, etc), as witnessed by the recent increase in security
breaches of high profile institutions.
New thinking and a new approach to data security is evi-
dently needed. In this paper, we will evaluate the evolution and
current state-of-the-art of data security paradigms, discussing
how these paradigms are implemented and what application
areas they are suited to, along with their possible short-
comings.
The contribution of this paper is to set an agenda for the
exploration of new and innovative data security paradigms.
The paper proposes a set of properties that a data security
mechanism should provide for future inter-connected cyber
systems.
B. Structure of the Paper
In section II, we begin with a brief discussion of the prob-
lems associated with existing data security paradigms. We then
examine the area of data, data-users and ownership/control,
which provides the definition that we subsequently use in this
paper. To elaborate on the current state of data security, we
discuss traditional access control mechanisms in section III.
This discussion leads to the idea of Digital Rights Management
(DRM) in section IV. Subsequently, in section V the paper
diverges into the concept of data provenance and how it relates
to data security. Sections III to V may seem to be a random
collection of different data security mechanisms: in this paper
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well-established but somewhat isolated fields that originally
focused on solving the issues of a niche market but which have
now inspired the Unified Model for Data Security (UMDS).
In section VI, we articulate the rationale for rethinking data
security not as an isolated but as a comprehensive unified
mechanism. Finally, in section VII we summarise the findings
of this paper and present the agenda for future research on
UMDS paradigms.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF
DATA, USER, AND OWNERSHIP
While IT innovation has progressed by leaps and bounds,
IT security techniques are still lagging behind. In this section,
we present the rationale behind the importance of data security
and why a rethinking exercise is necessary.
Subsequently, we discuss the concept of data users and
its various sub-categories. The section concludes with a brief
description of data control and how it is defined from the
perspectives of different stakeholders.
A. Data Security: The Problem
1) Defining Data: Data is defined as “factual information
(as measurements or statistics) used as a basis for reasoning,
discussion, or calculation” by the online Merriam Webster
dictionary1. The same dictionary defines data from a computer
science perspective as “information in numerical form that can
be digitally transmitted or processed”.
The nature of data in the digital space is different from the
general meaning of the word: data is any collection of numer-
ical (e.g. binary) values that a computer stores, processes, and
communicates. This can include software and associated in-
formation generated and/or consumed by software, hardware,
and users. Therefore, any assemblage in binary form, whether
as part of a software package or associated information, can
be categorised as data. If we follow this definition, then
anything in a digital environment (i.e. computers, mobile
phones, networks, etc.) is data. This definition is too vague
and encompasses a very broad range of devices, which is not
useful for our discussion. Therefore, we have tried to narrow
down the definition of data in the context of this paper:
“Data is a collection of numerical values (i.e. binary
values) that make a unique identifiable set, representing a
passive entity. Collection of data requires an active entity
(i.e. software, and hardware modules) to collect, process, and
communicate it.”
Programmes such as Microsoft Word, Excel, Acrobat PDF
and information stored in a database are categorised as data.
In each of the given examples, the collection has a unique
identifiable representation that notifies the software of the
nature of the collection, whether the collection is a PDF or a
Microsoft Word file. An executable file (e.g. exe) can also be
categorised as a data file until it starts execution, at which stage
it takes the role of an active entity that manipulates passive
entities (i.e. data files). Therefore, in this paper, data security
1Website: www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data
means the security of passive entities and not the process
executor’s (i.e. software and hardware) security.
2) The Obsolescence of Traditional Data Security Ap-
proaches: Most computer systems, including software and
hardware, are built to service data in one form or another.
Security of data has been recognised since ancient times,
which led to the development of cryptography and locked
cabinets. With the advent of computers and especially the
internet, readily available access to data stored at remote
locations mandated the development of security mechanisms.
Early implementation translated the traditional data security
controls (i.e. locked cabinets and cryptography) to the digital
world. This attempt brought in access control mechanisms (e.g.
password-based access) and secure channel communications
(rather than insecure network connection). Passwords replaced
keys to the locked resources which in the majority of cases
were related to data or some related services (i.e. email).
Soon it was realised that simply translating the physical
world’s security measures had limiting effects on digital space.
The overarching desire to share data and make it readily
collectable and available to a wide range of services can be
construed as a major cause of the limited effectiveness of
traditional data security mechanisms. For auditing purposes,
specialised mechanisms were designed so that system admin-
istrators could track who had accessed particular resources.
However, with the increased complexity of computer systems
and a vast array of data structures (files and databases) that
a user can use in a variety of ways, log recording became
cumbersome and for system administrators it became a hassle
to audit such logs. The log-based data protection mechanisms
were useful when data remained within well-defined bound-
aries.
However, well-defined boundaries are difficult to ascribe
in a modern IT infrastructure. Modern IT infrastructures are
inter-connected with third party IT systems, employees use
mobile and ubiquitous technologies that might be under the
control of an IT infrastructure administrator. Therefore, logs
are well suited to environments where data remains in a
clearly defined and centrally controlled environment; however,
with fluid boundaries and continuous flow of data across the
boundaries, such mechanisms have their limitations. In recent
years, data provenance has been put forward as a possible way
to track data across heterogeneous independently managed
environments. We will return to data provenance later in this
section V.
The Internet, and in recent years the advent of cloud
computing, has enabled malicious insiders (software including
worms and viruses, and disaffected employees) to ex-filtrate
sensitive data [6]. The difficulty in preventing information
leakage is exacerbated by cloud computing and over-reliance
on traditional protection mechanisms [7]. Furthermore, control
of data, its storage (e.g. location) and transformations is dif-
ficult to (independently) guarantee to be secure and traceable
(logs and provenance) – unless you trust your cloud provider.
The data is the most crucial element of any computer
system. Whether it belongs to an individual user (i.e. con-
sumers) or a large-scale organisation, the importance of data
cannot be undermined [8]. The paramount importance of data
3security is understood, and substantial work has been put
into achieving it. There are a number of different proposals
that do solve the problem in a confined view; however, from
a broad view of IT systems they have limited effectiveness
(e.g. access control against and information leakage by trusted
software or malicious insiders). We discuss a select few of
these data security proposals in sections III to V, illustrating
their application and effectiveness.
Figure 1. Evolution of Data Security and Quality Mechanism
With increases in the volume of data being generated/con-
sumed and the proliferation of data-sharing technologies,
different data security and quality mechanisms were proposed.
In Figure 1, we group many of these mechanisms into three
broad categories: access control, DRM, and provenance. These
groups of mechanisms are also evolving internally and pro-
viding their stated goals. However, these technologies in their
current state might not be the solution to future demands of
data sharing with strong security, privacy and auditability of
data items.
The problem in state-of-the-art data security is that there
is no holistic approach that looks at data security from a
comprehensive system view, rather than as a problem of
access control, cryptography, operating system or applications.
An effective cryptography will not be effective if there is
insecure key management, operating system vulnerabilities or
applications using the decrypted information and leaking those
to malicious entities. We are of the opinion that a holistic
approach to data security will express it as a system problem
– not just a cryptography or access control issue.
Before we begin the in-depth discussion of various data
security mechanisms, subsequent sections will discuss the
concepts of data ownership, use and control. Definitions of
these concepts are necessary in order to follow the discussion
in later sections of the paper.
B. Users, Data-Ownership and Control
The concept of data ownership is one of the most con-
tentious issues related to modern digital life. When a user
fills in an online form, and provides her details, who owns
the information that is part of the provided details? In most
cases, this information is most probably under the control of
the organisation that is collecting the information. Do they
own the data, even when it belongs to the users? What role
do “terms and conditions” play in such collection of data?
A recent example is the Instagram2 that made it acceptable
to publicly use customers’ uploaded images for commercial
purposes [9]. The language used in the terms and conditions
clearly gives Instagram the right to use customers’ data for
commercial purposes, but after a strong reaction from their
users they had to back down and pledged to remove the
condition from their terms and conditions [10].
As an example, Google’s privacy statement clearly points
out that contents uploaded by their users remains the users’
intellectual property. However, in the same privacy statement
they also list the following:
“When you upload or otherwise submit content to our Ser-
vices, you give Google (and those we work with) a worldwide
license to use, host, store, reproduce, modify, create derivative
works (such as those resulting from translations, adaptations
or other changes we make so that your content works better
with our Services), communicate, publish, publicly perform,
publicly display and distribute such content.”
So in simple words, users retain the intellectual property
rights to any work they upload on Google, but Google has
the right to snoop into the upload contents. Therefore, partial
ownership is still with the users, but they don’t have complete
control of what their data is used for. Similar examples can
be quoted from other online service providers.
Current data security techniques can offer limited protection
to a user, including access control and cryptography. Most of
the issues stem from the basic concept of data ownership and
control, along with the different roles a user performs. Data
ownership is defined as “the legal rights and complete control
over a single piece or set of data elements3”. Legal rights are
difficult to manage and contest in a court of law by individual
consumers, and the definition is closer to the organisational
ownership of their data, not an individual’s ownership of
her data, although legal rights and strong accountability are
proposed as a possible solution to the lack of effectiveness of
traditional data security measures [5]. From a data security
point of view, data ownership is the ability to control the
access, modification, and transmission of data along with the
ability to track and audit the data and associated processes.
The data owner, whether it is an individual user or an
organisation, has complete control over how, where, and by
whom their data can be accessed. In addition, the data owner
should have the ability to track the data and the processes
performed on it. A data owner also has the ability to delegate
the administration of its data to third parties, which act as
data custodians (i.e. Google in case of Google Docs). In the
current context, the data owner intrinsically transfers their
ownership rights (e.g. functionalities to control the data) to the
data custodians. The data owner has to trust the data custodian
and has no “technical” means of controlling any aspect of their
data beyond what is sanctioned by the data custodian.
In the context of the data users, they are individuals or
organisations that utilise the data (after explicit or implicit
permission from either the data owner or custodian). For
example, users may visit a news site to read some articles.
2Instagram: It is a popular photo-sharing app, owned by Facebook. Web
link instagram.com
3Web link: http://www.techopedia.com/definition/29059/data-ownership
4The owner/custodian of the news article has given permission
to access the information to the respective users. However, they
do not have any functionality to track the historic derivation
and possible future processes performed on the data.
Therefore, a data owner has complete control over a single
piece or set of data items. The control includes but is not
limited to the i) confidentiality, ii) integrity, iii) availability,
iv) access & access provisioning, v) communication, and
vi) tracking.The data custodian manages the data on behalf
of the data owner, but the provisions made with respect to
the control of data should be determined by the data owner.
For example, the data owner might delegate access and com-
munication control to the data custodian; as in a newspaper
article written by an author. The author has delegated the
ability to allow access to her article and communication to
the newspaper (organisation). A user is an individual or an
organisation that accesses or handles the content of the article
(data items) without any particular privileges in relation to it.
Although it represents an over-generalisation of the differ-
ent roles played by various actors in the IT infrastructure,
we have restricted them to distinct categories to make it
less complicated to understand the subsequent discussion.
In subsequent sections, we will initially look at the access
control mechanism, followed by DRMs, information sharing
and provenance.
III. DATA SECURITY THROUGH ACCESS CONTROL
Access control-related security mechanisms existed before
the advent of computers. The fundamental role of an access
control is to act as a gatekeeper, which will check individuals
arriving at the gate to ensure they have the required clearance
to pass through it. Such a mechanism has been successful
in the real world, so it is logical that early researchers in
computer science implemented similar mechanisms to protect
data and services. In this section we will look at different
access control models and why they are still evolving to
mitigate the issues associated with future challenges.
A. Access Control Models
To understand different access control models, understand-
ing of the concepts “subjects” and “objects” is crucial [11].
A subject is an entity that has the ability to manipulate and
use other entities in a computer system. Examples of subjects
can be human users, and processes. In comparison, an object
is an entity manipulated and/or used by subjects. Examples of
objects can be files, printers and even other subjects.
Therefore, an access control mechanism has to check
whether a subject has the right to access an object. The policy
that stipulates whether a subject can access an object, and
under what conditions, is referred as “access policy”. Access
policy stores the information regarding the privileges assigned
to individual subjects in relation to objects. Traditionally,
general categories of access control mechanisms were dis-
cretionary, mandatory, and roles-based [12]. In discretionary
access control, policy on an object is defined by the object’s
owner: the entity that has created the object. In mandatory
access control, the policy is defined at the system level and
usually by the system administrator. Finally, in role-based
access control, subjects are assigned roles, such as students
and cashiers. The access policy is then assigned to individual
roles rather than individual subjects. Role-based access control
is a different model to mandatory and discretionary systems
[3], even though there might seem to be an apparent similarity
to mandatory access models (i.e. replacing subjects for roles).
Early access control models were evolved from implemen-
tations in the military domain, which has clear and hard
delineations of individual subjects and objects and their re-
lationships, which in most cases do not change dynamically.
The adoption of computer technology in civilian organisations
that have a more fluid and dynamic relationship between
subjects and objects required an enhancement of the existing
models. Role-based access control is an example of one such
enhancement.
Increases in complexity and changes to organisational re-
quirements, technical capabilities, structures and relationships
with other organisations required new models to address such
changes. To keep up with the changes, more complex and
fine-grained access control models were proposed, such as
attribute-based access control, policy-based access control, and
risk-adaptive access control.
Attribute-based access control makes decisions based on the
attributes associated with requesters (subjects), environment
(IT system), and resources (objects) [13]. An important func-
tionality of this model is to enable a requester to gain access
without any prior registration with the system or resource. This
enables an organisation to implement an access control model
that accommodates unanticipated requesters.
Different organisations have different requirements in terms
of implementing risk management, accountability and compli-
ance with relevant laws and regulations. Examples include the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
for health care [14] and Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) for corpo-
rations [15]. Policy-based access control is a new model
that aims to address the requirement of having a mature
and secure access control model based on abstract policy
and governance requirements [16]. In most implementations,
policy-based access control models are implemented as an
extension to attribute-based access control models [17].
Modern organisations are dynamic and changes to their op-
erational environment are constant. Such changes are initiated
by legal requirements, economic and financial realities and
risk factors. This dynamic nature extends to their security
and access control mechanisms. Access control models do
not adequately address this dynamic and constantly evolving
nature of today’s cyber security. The risk-adaptive access
control model aims to take into account real-time, adaptable,
and risk-aware mechanisms [18]. Risk-adaptive access control
models are implemented over the traditional access control
models with the right to change access policies dynamically
[19]. In addition, such models require Trusted Platform Mod-
ules (TPMs) [20], automated behavioural analysis [21], and
machine learning algorithms [22] which are still either not
widely adopted or not integrated with access control models
[17]. Furthermore, risk-adaptive access control requires a
well-defined and unambiguous mechanism that generates and
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adaptive access control model makes the decisions. A well
implemented risk-adaptive access control model will require
data confidence regarding the environmental conditions, which
can be provided by data provenance [23] discussed briefly in
section V.
B. Wrapping Up on the Discussion
Except for the risk-adaptive access control model, all other
models are based on static policies that require external inter-
ference. This means that with fast-changing threat landscapes,
the reaction time to avoid any data breaches is very short.
To be effective in such a rapidly changing environment, the
access control mechanism has to have dynamic adaptability.
Furthermore, access control is point-of-entrance security. Once
a malicious entity has passed this point, it is difficult to restrict
its actions within the privileges of the entity. The data might be
breached in a manner that is totally permitted by the privileges
assigned to the entity; for example, covert channels [24]
or unintended consequences of ambiguous policies. Access
control mechanisms are an important element of data security,
although their effectiveness is still debatable. However, any
data security mechanism has to implement access control in
one way or another – it is difficult to implement a compre-
hensive data security without access control.
IV. DATA SECURITY THROUGH DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT (DRM)
In our inter-connected world, software and data are trans-
acted as commodities. A software company might want to sell
its products online, but does not want its customers to make
illegal copies of their software. Similarly, the media industry
might want to sell movies and songs to consumers with an
assurance that their intellectual property will be protected even
when it is no longer under their direct control.
Digital rights management systems have been proposed
for the above-mentioned requirements [25]. DRMs represent
the set of technologies deployed by hardware manufacturers4,
and software/data copyright holders to control their contents
(products) after they are sold. In most cases such devices,
software, and data are in the possession of their consumers
(or their devices). Consumers can have malicious intentions
and may want to reproduce the contents (illegally [27]).
In the next section, we will briefly discuss DRM architecture
and related challenges.
A. Digital Rights Management in a Nutshell
A DRM system has essential components including, i) con-
tents coding (language), ii) content identification, iii) packag-
ing (cryptography), iv) distribution, v) digital rights assertion
and usage, vi) tracking and monitoring [28]. The DRM system
requires all the participants to implement the listed function-
ality.
4To avoid hardware counterfeiting, manufacturers might deploy Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUF) [26] that can be categorised as a DRM technol-
ogy.
We consider a generic DRM system. A content genera-
tor will code its digital content as required by the content
distributor. The content generator is the intellectual property
owner and the content distributor (provider) is the entity
that distributes the contents to individual users. For example,
iTunes5 is a content distributor while the media companies
that make their contents available to consumers via iTunes are
content generators.
Content providers will transform the digital content and
associated rights using Digital Rights Expression Languages
(RELs). Examples are Markup Language (XrML) [29], Open
Digital Rights Language (ODRL) [30] and MPEG-21 [31].
The RELs can be considered as a way to convey the access
control information to the consumer’s content reader [32]. The
digital content is communicated securely (using secure channel
protocols) to individual consumers. At the consumer end, a
DRM enforcement entity will manage the download content
and associated policy.
One of the most crucial items, prone to a wide array of
threats in the DRM ecosystem, is the rights enforcement
and management entity. To strengthen it, a four-layer se-
curity framework was proposed that was based on content
protection, rights enforcement, rights management and trust
management [33]. Rights enforcement and management are
similar to access control models, and many of the models
discussed in the previous section are implemented as part of
the DRM ecosystem. In addition to implementing traditional
access models, the DRM system led to the development of the
persistent access control model [34].
Content usage generates content tracking information: the
DRM enforcement entity on the client side can record (and
may transmit) the tracking information to the content provider.
The tracking information is to interoperate with the rights
management to ensure that the consumer abides by the lease
agreement governing the digital contents. The lease agreement
might have limits on the number of accesses, or time restric-
tions6.
When implementing DRM systems (only) in software, sup-
ported by general purpose operating systems, it is a chal-
lenge to provide a strong notion of remote attestation and
seal (cryptographic) techniques [35]. Traditional protection
mechanisms implemented as part of the operating system (e.g.
access control) cannot protect decrypted contents and provide
assurance that the DRM policy has been securely enforced
[36].
A secure, reliable and trusted execution environment with a
remote attestation mechanism is necessary for a secure DRM
system. The inclusion of the TPM provided a logical choice
to provide such an environment for the DRM system [37].
DRM provides a cross-platform and/or infrastructure assur-
ance that the data (or software) will be used as sanctioned in
the associated policy. Traditional access control mechanisms
can only enforce the access policy with regard to the data
items that are directly under its control, whereas DRM tries to
5iTunes: It is a digital media management, distribution and usage applica-
tion developed by Apple Inc. Web link: http://www.apple.com/itunes/
6BBC iPlayer has a time limit on downloaded contents that at maximum
can be 28 days.
6provide the same level of security but on a remote device that
is not under the control of the content generator (data owner).
B. DRM Technologies: The Verdict
In modern cyber life, a huge amount of personal data is
uploaded to different companies (e.g. Facebook and Google).
A possible solution (in a limited sense) can come from the
DRM-based mechanisms that enable a data owner to control
her data [38]. As DRM might be getting a new lease of life
as a privacy-preserving technology, it is slowly falling from
relevance in its traditional settings7.
Whatever the final outcome, the basic design principle
of remotely managing data access even under a malicious
host/user is necessary for any future data security strategy.
DRM might not be implemented in the same way as today,
but the lessons learned from DRM research will definitely help
any future proposals.
V. DATA SECURITY THROUGH DATA PROVENANCE
In the previous sections, we have looked at mechanisms that
protect data from unauthorised access or usage. In this section,
we will look at data provenance that can help in data auditing
and tracking of changes that happen to the data.
A. Traditional Provenance Perspectives
As the amount of data produced increases exponentially,
there is an ever-growing interest in understanding how a
particular piece of data was created and what manipulations
the given data has gone through in the past.
Data provenance can be defined as a snapshot of all the
transformations a data item has gone through during the
process that created the data item. In other words, as defined
by [23, 41, 42] provenance is the meta-data of the derivation
history of data. Data provenance is an important component
in many data-intense studies and/or industries like eScience
[43] and healthcare [44]. In such environments, provenance
ensures the quality of data and repeatability of results.
Early provenance systems were mainly concerned with the
data quality of a database, to ensure that no error crept into
large and lengthy calculations. Even if such errors appeared,
a provenance system allowed a query mechanism to search
the source of such an error, so other possible data items that
in their provenance record included the particular node which
was found to be the culprit could also be adjusted to avoid the
proliferation of errors produced. A substantial body of work
has been conducted in the domain of data provenance related
to databases [45].
B. Emerging Provenance Challenges
In recent years, the advent of cloud computing and doc-
ument security across distributed systems have given a new
dimension to data provenance design and requirements [41,
7Apple and EA decided that DRM is not a viable technology for content
distribution [39, 40]. Apple went for watermarking, so illegal copies can be
tracked back to the users who bought them and then they might be held
accountable.
46]–[48]. Furthermore, provenance is collected at different
levels in a system and between systems [41]: some mechanism
collects the provenance at the application layer8. Examples of
provenance mechanism collection at the system layer are HP’s
TrustCloud (Flogger) [46, 47], S2Logger [49], DataPROVE
[41] and PASS [42]. There is also an increasing call for a
data-centric view over the traditional system-centric view for
cloud computing [50]. Zhang et al. [41], after considering the
traditional provenance [51] and emerging provenance criteria,
stipulated the following core requirements and properties of
cloud data provenance systems that address common chal-
lenges listed, and make provenance in the cloud truly useful:
1) Coordination between storage and computing facilities:
Provenance, like typical digital data in a cloud, is gener-
ated and processed by computer facilities, and maintained
on storage facilities.
2) Interface/API that allows customers to record provenance
of their objects. If data originating from non-provenanced
sources is to be stored in the cloud, a solution to in-
complete provenance is to allow verified/signed manual
input of provenance for the data, with the help of a well-
designed interface and/or API.
3) Security elements that need to be provided for reliable
provenance:
• Integrity: The assurance that provenance is not forged
or tampered. An extensive range of papers have been
presented on how to secure the provenance record [52,
53]; however, it was difficult to find any provenance-
related work that presents a mechanism to provide
complete data security.
• Availability and Auditability: An auditor can check the
integrity and the correctness of provenance informa-
tion, though how to prohibit or detect suspicious user
annotation and false provenance fabricated by malware
is still an open question.
• Confidentially: Provenance may contain sensitive in-
formation about the data it describes, or it may be
sensitive information by itself. Encryption methods and
access control policies for provenance are a necessity
to prevent information leakage from provenance. It is
difficult to ensure confidentially when inside intruders
such as privileged administrators and cloud service
providers are involved.
4) Provenance data consistency: Provenance information
must be consistent with the data it describes. Incon-
sistency in provenance and its data can mislead both
customers and service providers.
5) Atomicity: Provenance must be recorded atomically with
the data it describes. Atomicity pertains to provenance
storage, whereas consistency pertains to provenance and
data retrieval. Atomicity and consistency together assure
that provenance accurately and completely describes the
data, i.e., provenance data-coupling.
6) Causal ordering: A provenance system must ensure that
an object’s ancestors and their provenance are persistent
8most if not all of the database provenance mechanisms collect provenance
in this layer
7before making the object itself persistent, which pre-
vents dangling pointers from appearing in the provenance
recorded as a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
7) Data independent persistence, also referred to as long-
term persistence: A provenance system retains an object’s
provenance even after the object is removed. Although
an object is removed, its provenance must still be present
in the provenance DAG as some other objects’ ancestor;
deleting the object’s provenance will make the DAG
disconnected. An object’s provenance can be removed
only if it has no descendants.
8) Efficient query: The primary use of provenance data is for
users to check the lineage properties of a corresponding
object of interest, through external queries. Considering
the graph structure of provenance and the large size of the
cloud and the objects stored in it, efficiency of querying
affects directly the value of provenance.
We consider that provenance can become a post authen-
tication data security mechanism, where discovery and trace
of a data breach can easily be discovered using the system
provenance. However, papers on the topic of research issues,
and survey papers on data provenance do not elaborate on
any such proposal [54]. Data provenance, if implemented as
a light-weight mechanism at system level, can provide an
excellent auditing tool, which in our opinion is an important
component of a holistic approach to data security. Further-
more, data provenance records might help risk-adaptive access
control mechanisms to make better informed decisions.
In the applicability of provenance in data security, imple-
menters should consider the elements that are not required
to be stored – even their history can lead to security and/or
privacy violations. For example, storing the internal state (es-
pecially the seed values) of a pseudorandom number generator
[55] as discussed by [42].
VI. UNIFIED MODEL FOR DATA SECURITY
In subsequent sections, we briefly discuss a few of the data
security and quality mechanisms that we think adequately
represent the gaps between different fields. With the gaps
addressed, we aim to work towards addressing data security
according to modern day challenges.
A. Objectives of the Unified Model
The main aim of the unified model is to bridge this gap
and create a data security model that is flexible enough to
accommodate complex polices and scalable to be deployed
from embedded environments like cyber physical systems to
the cloud computing environment.
The unified model takes into account the three main com-
ponents of a data security (see Figure 1):
1) ex ante (gate-keeping),
2) policy enforcement, and
3) audit/trackability.
The unified model is not the overlaping part of the three
components. It is the complete integration of all three of
them.We propose that the unified model can be implemented
Figure 2. Overview of Unified Model
as a standalone component, like a virtual machine on a device,
and all data accesses are handled by the virtual data machine.
It can also be implemented at the same layer as the kernel,
between system services and hardware, but it separates data-
related routines from general routines (existing kernel) and
includes them in a secure and trusted data kernel. Both
methodologies, whether the unified model is implemented as a
virtual (data) machine or data kernel, should have the support
of tamper-resistant hardware (e.g. TPM).
The unified model can be understood as a proposal that
merges and enhances existing mechanisms proposed for dif-
ferent data security (sub-set) requirements. In subsequent
sections, we will describe a list of possibility functionalities
that are considered to be crucial for the unified model.
B. Agenda for a Unified Model
This section presents the list of requirements for the unified
model.
1) Confidentiality: Access to data is only granted to au-
thorised and trustworthy entities/processes after explicit
verification of identity.
2) Integrity: Modification to data can only be permit-
ted if carried out by authorised and trustworthy enti-
ties/processes. Any unauthorised modification should be
detectable.
3) Availability: Unauthorised entities/processes should not
have the ability to monopolise the resources (i.e. data).
4) Data Confidence: A data consumer (i.e. entities and/or
processes) can gain assurance about the historic transfor-
mation that the respective data has gone through.
5) Trust: Data consumers should have a mechanism to evalu-
ate and validate the trustworthiness of data, including the
trust evaluation of individual entities, and processes that
have handled the data along with individual operations in
the past.
6) Auditability: Each access and transformation performed
on data is recorded as an integral part of the data. Such a
record will facilitate the data audit to establish confidence
and trust in the data. This feature can also be used by
system auditors to validate the derivation and security
aspects of the data.
7) Accountability and Appropriate Use: Effective auditabil-
ity could enable the accountability of malign entities/pro-
8cesses that handled the data. Such entities/processes
might be authorised to access data but their purview did
not include the actions they performed.
8) Forensic Evidence Preservation: The system has the
resilience to protect the forensic evidence, enabling a
secure and tamper-evident data provenance that can assist
investigators to analyse possible data breaches.
9) Privacy (and Accessibility): Privacy of data should be
protected and any policy defined by the data owner
should be enforced in a secure manner. In addition to
privacy, certain data items require accessibility in certain
limited situations, like healthcare data in an emergency.
Therefore, the policy should be flexible enough to cover
such rare events.
10) Dynamic Policy Changes: To accommodate the chang-
ing environment and diversity of host devices (system)
that will handle the data, the policy should be dynami-
cally modifiable to accommodate any local environment-
specific changes.
11) Risk Averse and Automatically Adaptable: The unified
model should be able to detect the changing landscape
of risk and adapt the security and privacy policies to
adequately represent the data owner’s requirements with
changing threat vectors.
12) Data Ownership: Data control should be completely given
to the data owner. The unified model should ensure that
no other authority, whether an authorised entity or a
malicious entity, gains any data control privileges unless
explicitly expressed by the data owner.
13) Revocation: The data control privileges and data access
rights given to data custodians or data users should be
revocable if required by the data owner.
14) Inescapable: Access to the data items should not be cir-
cumventable around the unified data model components
(figure 2)
15) Feasible: The implementation of the unified model is
technically viable and lightweight, so its inclusion does
not adversely affect the overall performance of the host
environment.
16) Scalable: The model is scalable from resource constraint
embedded devices to cloud computing environments.
17) Flexible: The policy descriptor should be unambiguously
expressive enough so that it can represent data security
policies in a control-rich manner, enabling a wide variety
of data owners to define the policy.
The above list is not an exhaustive one; however, it is a
fundamental requirement stipulated as a point of reference for
the development of the Unified Model. We do not propose the
model to be a panacea for all information security problems,
however, this model might be able to streamline the issues
facing data security in rapidly changing environments and
react to it, possibly in real-time. Taking the Figure 2 and the
requirements listed in this section, we can make an informed
guess that a possible unified model can be constructed by
integrating risk-adaptive access control mechanism as ex ante,
DRM style policy management and enforcement, and data
provenance to provide secure data audit and trackability. All
these mechanisms will feed into each other, providing valuable
information to each of the components and enabling adequate
decisions to be made.
Using the unified model, an individual consumer or an
organisation can manage, control and track (audit) their data
in the cyber world. For example, social media consumers can
upload their data to the remote servers (may be in cloud) but
still able to control the dissemination of their data along with
track it (and associated actions performed on it). The data
repository on the social media servers has to negotiate the
rights (access, communication, usage and tacking policies)
with the consumer. In addition, the data repository has to
provide adequate security assurances to the consumer (unified
model’s implementation on the consumer device) that it will
use the data in accordance with stated policy. The security
assurances has to be independently verifiable and trust in
social media company or their infrastructure should not be
implicit. The unified model can be considered as a first step
towards the empowerment of data owners (end-user or an
organisation) to control the access, security, dissemination,
usage and trackability of their respective data.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This paper presented the security challenges associated with
a crucial component of modern day IT infrastructure: data.
A data breach might damage the image of an organisation,
or if not, drive it out of business. We discussed the def-
inition of data, and different entities that interact with it
in different capacities. Before beginning a generic overview
of the proposed unified model, we elaborated on the three
prominent domains that deal with the data in one form or
another. These domains included access control, DRM and
data provenance. The description of these domains provided
the initial foundation of the unified model. The unified model
covers different data security, privacy, and quality mechanisms
to provide a streamlined approach to data protection. The main
goal of the unified model is to be flexible and scalable. We also
provided a list of potential requirements that possible future
work on the unified model has to take into account.
Future research directions will look into the security, privacy
and usability challenges to the unified model, followed by the
requirement of a trusted execution environment and how such
an environment might be provisioned in systems ranging from
embedded to cloud. Further work will involve the integration
of the three main components of the unified model and
how they can establish a beneficial symbiotic relationship to
enhance current data security needs.
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